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Whereas the number of paid overtime hours declined over the last two decades in Germany, a 
different trend can be observed for unpaid overtime. We analyze future consequences of unpaid 
work with respect to a worker’s career advancement, such as higher future wages and 
probabilities of promotion or job retention, which might help to explain why an increasing 
fraction of employees are working extra hours for free. Data from the SOEP for the years 1993 
to 2004 are used to examine whether working a higher number of unpaid extra hours involves a 
higher probability of promotion and excess earnings growth, and a lower probability of layoff in 
subsequent years. The pooled, random effects, and fixed effects logit estimates reveal limited 
evidence for the investment character of unpaid overtime hours with respect to future wage 
growth and promotions. Moreover, unpaid extra hours do not help to prevent future layoffs, 
except for East German women. For West German men, unpaid overtime hours are positively 
associated with the risk of future dismissal 
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1. Introduction   
The decline in paid overtime and the rise in unpaid overtime during the past two decades in 
Germany have contributed to the fact that nowadays, unpaid hours are more important than paid 
extra work. Both the incidence and the average amount of unpaid hours have risen, and 
particularly non-managerial occupations are increasingly affected by unpaid overtime.
1 Yet, the 
public discussion on working time is still largely characterized by its focus on paid extra hours, 
for which measurement is simpler and for which information is available from official statistics. 
As more evidence is much needed to evaluate the emergence and effects of other forms of extra 
hours, this study investigates future consequences of unpaid overtime. In particular, the link 
between a worker’s current unpaid hours and his career advancement is examined. Future 
returns, such as pay rises and higher probabilities of promotion and job retention, might help to 
explain why an increasing fraction of workers supplies extra hours for free. A positive 
relationship between unpaid overtime and future payoffs would, furthermore, revise the picture 
of unpaid working hours, as they might be well compensated after all. Likewise, the study’s aim 
is to shed light on the consequences for workers who do not invest in unpaid overtime. If 
workers need to put in long hours to be compensated later on in form of job retention, career 
advancement and wage growth, the issue might be raised whether this payment scheme puts 
some worker groups at a disadvantage. Workers who are constrained in their abilities to supply 
long hours, such as women with family obligations or workers with health problems, might be 
excluded from certain positions or hierarchy levels in a company and suffer relative wage losses. 
 
The following section provides an overview on studies that investigate the investment character 
of overtime and summarizes theories which can explain a positive relationship between working 
hours and future payoffs. Section 3 describes the data, the sample, and the construction of the 
variables which will be used in the analysis. Section 4 provides a descriptive overview on 
overtime and career advancement in Germany. The empirical methods will be given in Section 5. 
Section 6 presents the estimation results, as well as the results of the robustness checks and of  
extensions of the model. Section 7 concludes. 
                                                           
1 Data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) shows that unpaid hours worked by clerks, and 
service and sales workers have substantially increased during the last two decades. 
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2.  Unpaid Overtime and Future Payoffs 
2.1.   Previous Research 
A first evidence on future payoffs by working longer hours is given by Bell and Freeman (2001). 
They compare actual working hours in the U.S. and Germany, and investigate the relationship 
between wage inequality and labor supply as well as the effect of actual working hours on future 
wages and promotion. They find that workers react to wage inequality by increasing their 
working hours, and that workers are more likely to expect a promotion if they worked long hours 
in the past. Empirical evidence for the investment character of overtime has been also provided 
by Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2003) who show for the U.K. that the amount of overtime 
correlates with subsequent promotions in a significantly positive way. Likewise, Francesconi 
(2001) examines the determinants of promotions for workers in Great Britain, and finds that 
working one overtime hour per week increases the likelihood of promotion by 0.1% for men and 
0.3% for women. However, the studies of Booth et al. (2003) and Francesconi (2001) do not 
differentiate between paid and unpaid overtime work. Another study for the U.K. is conducted 
by Campbell and Green (2002) who reveal that there are positive though diminishing long-term 
returns from working longer hours. Furthermore, they find that the greatest impact on payoffs 
stems from unpaid overtime. Bell, Gaj, Hart, Hübler, and Schwerdt (2000) reveal a positive 
relationship between unpaid overtime and perceived promotion prospects for workers in Great 
Britain. In contrast, they find no significant effects of overtime on promotions for Germany 
using data from the SOEP for 1997. Pannenberg (2005) uses the same dataset, and finds 
supportive evidence for the investment character of unpaid extra hours by investigating long-
term effects of unpaid overtime in West Germany. He reveals that there are substantial long-term 
labor earnings effects associated with cumulative average unpaid overtime, which is evidence for 
the importance of investing in current working hours beyond the standard work week to enhance 
real earnings prospects. He shows that workers with at least some incidence of unpaid overtime 
experience the highest wage growth.  
 
The objective of this empirical study is to analyze whether working hours can be interpreted as 
an investment for workers in East and West Germany. We investigate whether unpaid extra 
hours are associated with wage growth, promotion probabilities, and with the risk of losing a job. 
Therefore, we extend the study by Bell et al. (2000) in as much as we exploit the longitudinal 
character of the SOEP by using more waves of data, and as we employ an alternative measure of 
promotion, which will be explained in Section 3. In contrast to Pannenberg (2005) we do not 
concentrate on long-term effects of unpaid extra hours but focus on payoffs in the near future. 
This might be important, as employment relationships have become increasingly fragile within 
the recent years. A considerable fraction of the workforce merely enters a short-term or medium-Discussion Papers   535 
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term contract with their employer, which implies that a compensation in the near future might be 
more relevant to these workers. 
 
2.2.   Theoretical Considerations 
Several theories can be considered to generate the positive relationship between present working 
hours and future outcomes. In a simple cost minimization framework, additional productive 
hours in form of overtime lead firms to choose overtime workers to be promoted or retained, 
since they provide relatively cheap labor to the firm. This is not only true for the case of unpaid 
overtime, but also for the case of paid overtime, since the firm can adjust labor at the inner 
margin by the use of extra hours and therefore save fix cost that would arise in the case of hiring 
additional workers. Higher current and future wages for unpaid overtime workers might also be 
interpreted as a reward in the sense of gift exchange (Akerlof, 1984). Firms might pay above 
market wages and therefore induce workers to counteroffer a gift to the firm. This gift takes the 
form of long working hours in excess of the hours specified in the contract and might again be 
rewarded with higher than market level earnings. This leads to a positive correlation between 
unpaid work and wage payments. Moreover, the gift could also be given to the worker in form of 
more general career advancement. In addition, the human capital theory is capable of considering 
working hours as investment. Assuming that overtime hours are used to acquire specific human 
capital (Booth et al., 2003), the human capital model can explain why they yield a return later on.  
 
Another explanation is provided by the literature of deferred compensation (Lazear, 1979), 
which deals with incentive provisions in long-term worker-employer relationships, in which 
output is difficult to measure. In order to encourage higher worker effort, optimal compensation 
contracts are structured in a way that workers are paid below their marginal revenue product 
during the early part of their career and above their productivity later on. As future pay will 
exceed productivity, workers are induced to put in high effort at the beginning in order to avoid 
their layoff. Another incentive provision results from the implementation of performance-related 
compensation schemes, in which firms are indifferent towards the level of working time, but 
reward higher output. This might induce workers to provide unpaid extra hours to receive 
monetary benefits, such as discrete bonuses, profit sharing, stock options, or commissions 
(Prendergast, 1999). Likewise, overtime workers might be more likely to be promoted due to 
their higher performance and overall productivity.
2 Another model that is frequently used to 
explain promotions is the tournament theory (Lazear, 1981), which assumes that the number of 
payoffs is limited. The future rewards are usually fixed in advance, and workers are not 
                                                           
2 However, promotions and wage increases do not necessarily reflect worker productivity. According to the theory 
of strategic promotions, firms might attempt to delay promotions or pay rises of the most able workers, as career 
advancement would signal the high value of the worker to outside firms. The latter may be induced to make 
counteroffers to the worker and therefore drive up the wage. For strategic promotions, see e.g. Waldmann (1984), 
Bernhardt (1995), or Gibbons and Katz (1992). Discussion Papers   535 
2  Unpaid Overtime and Future Payoffs 
 
4 
necessarily remunerated according to their marginal product, as their relative performance 
matters, regardless of the absolute output. If the employer is indifferent to the time needed to 
complete certain jobs tasks, the advancement in the tournament might depend on the amount of 
overtime hours, which might be taken as direct measure of effort. This is the case in rat-race 
models (Landers, Rebitzer, and Taylor, 1996), where promotion decisions are made on the basis 
of long working hours, which are used as screening device for low disutility of work.  
 
Lastly, the investment character of working time is consistent with the signaling theory, with 
unpaid overtime serving as signal of productivity, motivation, or loyalty to the employer. The 
signaling model by Spence (1973) was originally applied to the problem of asymmetric 
information in the job recruiting process. However, it might be extended to the post hiring 
period, if monitoring is difficult and if the firm has incomplete information on worker 
productivity. The information asymmetry might lead to decisions on career advancement being 
made on the basis of unpaid overtime or other characteristics which are easier to observe than 
productivity. Therefore, working longer hours and providing them even for free might increase 
the probability of pay rise and promotion and decrease the probability of layoff. If unpaid 
overtime is merely used to separate workers on the basis of the signal, workers might engage in 
competitive presenteeism (Simpson, 1998), and stay long hours in the firm in order to be seen, 





                                                           
3 In contrast, a negative relationship between unpaid overtime hours and future payoffs might be explained by the 
signal of lower productivity, as low-productivity workers need longer to complete certain jobs tasks.  Discussion Papers   535 




3.1.   Sample and Variable Description 
The data used in this study were made available by the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(SOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin. We use SOEP data 
from 1993 to 2004 for male and female East and West German full-time employees aged 
between 20 and 60. Workers older than 60 were dropped because their workweek might be 
shortened in the course of retirement plans, and working hours are unlikely to have an 
investment character. Furthermore, we exclude foreigners, civil servants, self-employed persons, 
and workers employed in the agricultural sector. Although East Germans took part in the survey 
since 1991, we only use the waves from 1993 on, since not all of the variables are available for 
the East German sample before. Respondents with missing information on promotions, 
dismissals, and earnings in the next period and on other crucial variables, such as working hours, 
are dropped. Our unbalanced panel includes only those respondents who participate in at least 
two subsequent waves of the survey in order to be able to control for individual unobserved 
heterogeneity. In total, the sub-sample consists of about 20,900 person-year observations, with 
12,600 in West Germany and 8,300 in East Germany. 
 
The SOEP provides detailed information on whether overtime is worked, on the amount of 
overtime hours per month and on overtime compensation.
4 We take overtime hours per week and 
combine it with the information on overtime compensation in order to obtain the amount of 
unpaid overtime hours per week which is the crucial independent variable in our study. As 
further control variables, we additionally include other compensation forms of overtime and 
contractual working time, as well as desired working hours. To control for heterogeneity 
between workers, we add a number of worker and firm characteristics which might potentially 
affect the probability of promotion, wage growth, and layoff. Therefore, we include control 
variables for occupations, blue-collar and white-collar workers, firm size, whether a person 
works in the public sector, whether he holds a temporary or a permanent position, and whether 
he recently changed his job. To capture a worker’s motivation, we add a variable for job 
satisfaction to the covariates in some of the estimates. Further independent variables are age, 
marital status, education, work experience, and tenure. All regressions additionally include 
industry, region, and year dummies as controls. It is certainly important to take the economic 
situation of the firm into account, as promotions and pay rises as well as layoffs certainly depend 
                                                           
4 The original questions in the SOEP read as follows: ”Do you work overtime?” [Yes/No/Not applicable because I 
am self-employed]; “If you work overtime, is the work paid, compensated with time-off, or not compensated at all?” 
[Compensated with time-off/Partly paid, partly compensated with time-off/Paid/Not compensated at all]; “How was 
your situation with regards to overtime last month? Did you work overtime? If yes, how many hours?” [Yes, ____ 
hours/No]. Discussion Papers   535 
3  Data 
  
6 
on the firm’s profits. However, since the SOEP provides no detailed firm information, we try to 
capture firm success by the GDP growth in the firm specific sector within a worker’s region. All 
regressions are run separately for men and women as well as for East and West German workers. 




3.2.   Payoff Variables 
For career advancement two measures are used, job promotion and wage growth, which are quite 
standard in the literature on promotions (Groeneveld and Hartog, 2004). For wage growth we do 
not only use monthly gross earnings but also extra payments, such as Christmas bonus, holiday 
pay, income from profit sharing, and other bonuses, as extra payments have become increasingly 
important in recent years. Pierce (1999) finds that excluding extra payments from earnings tends 
to understate wage differentials. In the SOEP, information on extra payments are only revealed 
in the subsequent wave of a respective year. Therefore, the sample is considerably reduced and 
we cannot use observations in 2004, except for the information on extra payments. However, 
since these additional payments are considered to be substantial to this study, observations 
without this information are dropped. We construct a dummy variable for excess earnings 
growth as in Groeneveld and Hartog (2004) who point out that the use of  dummy variables to 
measure career development is a strong test of the investment theory. Excess earnings growth is 
defined as growth, which is at least one standard deviation higher than the average earnings 
growth of workers in the same job scale in the respective year. Earnings averages are calculated 
for East and West German workers separately. In our sample, around 10% of both, East and 
West Germans, experience excess earnings growth between the current and the subsequent 
interview.  
 
Unfortunately, the SOEP does not provide direct information on promotions, and merely 
includes questions on promotion expectations by the workers. Information on expected 
promotion is used by a number of studies not only for Germany, but also for the U.K. (Bratti and 
Staffolani, 2005). Bell and Freeman (2001) use expected information from the SOEP and 
observe that 20% of German workers expected a promotion, whereas only 10% of U.S. workers 
experienced a real promotion. This might hint to actual promotions being overstated, when 
expectation information is used. Hence, their revealed positive effects of long working hours on 
promotion expectations might overestimate the effects of current working time on real promotion 
prospects. A further drawback is that the information on subjective promotion prospects is not  
                                                           
5 The sub-samples of men and women and of East and West German workers might also be analyzed in one single 
regression. However, since the Chow test for structural change (Greene, 2000) revealed that the regression 
coefficients are significantly different in the above mentioned subsets of the data, analyses are conducted by running 
separate regressions. 
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available for the years 1995, 1996, 2000, 2002, and 2004. Alternative promotion measures for 
SOEP data are used by Bell, Gaj, Hart, Hübler, and Schwerdt (2000). They assume workers with 
job changes to be promoted if they state that their chances of being promoted has been enhanced 
in the new job, or if there was an improvement of the workers’ position within the group of blue-
collar or white-collar workers. Furthermore, they consider an improvement in the job prestige 
indicators as promotion, but do not find significant effects for any of these promotion measures 
in their estimation results for data from 1997.  
 
We slightly vary the promotion measure used by Bell et al. (2000) and construct a dummy 
variable for promotion by combining information on intra-firm changes with the workers’ 
evaluations of their new positions. We consider a worker to be promoted if he changes his 
position within a firm and, in addition, self-rates his new position to be superior with respect to 
either his earnings or his tasks, or both. We do not define job changes as promotion if either 
earnings have decreased or if job tasks have worsened compared to the previous position. 
Furthermore, we use the SOEP information on four blue-collar and five white-collar job scales, 
and additionally define a promotion as an increase in the rank of the job scale from one year to 
the other. In our sample, 9% of the West German workers experienced at least one promotion 
between 1993 and 2004, whereas this percentage was only 6% for East Germans. Among the 
workers who expected a promotion, only 10% were observed to actually experience a promotion 
in the subsequent year according to our promotion measure. This may indicate that subjective 
promotion prospect are not an accurate measure for real promotion probabilities. However, 
promotions might be underestimated by the measure used in this study. One potential reason is 
attrition bias, as workers might be more likely to drop out of the survey after having experienced 
a promotion. However, this does not seem to be the case, as workers in our sample who expect a 
promotion and those without any promotion prospects are found to have a similar attrition rate. 
Furthermore, the respective information might suffer from recall bias. For instance, workers 
might have difficulties to remember a job change if the change implied only small modifications 
in the workplace. This might also explain the relatively low promotion rate in our sample 
compared to other studies,
6 as it has been shown that not all of the declared promotions in 
surveys are actual changes in positions. Pergamit and Veum (1999) use the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth to show that of the 24% of workers who reported a promotion 
during the last year, the majority experienced no change in their position. A large fraction (30%) 
had the same job tasks as before, or a simple “upgrade” of the position. Therefore, we should 
keep in mind that the promotion measure used in this study is more narrowly defined and more 
likely to imply major changes in the workplace. According to our promotion measure, demotions 
and absence of promotions are not distinguished, since demotions are a very rare event. Nor do 
                                                           
6 Whereas Francesconi (2001) and Booth et al. (2003) find a yearly promotion rate of 9% for Great Britain, the 
promotion rate for our sample is only around 2% per year. Belzil and Bognanno (2004) even have a promotion rate 
of 11%  in their sample of American executives. 
 Discussion Papers   535 
3  Data 
  
8 
we differentiate between promotions for more than one level in the job scale and standard 
promotions, where the worker just reaches the next job scale. Furthermore, we do not take into 
account past promotion histories, although past promotions, and in particular speed of 
promotion, might affect current promotion prospects. The effect of past promotion on current 
promotion probabilities is referred to as fast track effects in the literature, as past promotions 
might indicate differences in ability and also have a signaling effect. However, we are not able to 
take promotion histories into account, since the restriction to a balanced panel, i.e. only persons 
with information in all of the years, would deplete the sample size excessively. This is even more 
problematic, as the consideration of past promotions requires the observation of a fairly long 
time period, since promotion cycles have been shown to be of a relatively long duration of about 
seven years (Lazear, 1992). 
 
The construction of the third dependent variable, experience of layoff, is more straightforward, 
since information on the ending of an employment can be combined with the stated reason for 
the job leave. A layoff refers to any dissolution of the employment between the last and the 
current interview, which was initiated by the firm and is not due to firm closure.
7 In the estimates 
of the layoff probability, regional unemployment rates are added to the covariates, as these may 
reflect the local level of labor demand (Böheim and Taylor, 2003). Therefore, unemployment 
rates by employment office district (“Arbeitsamtbezirk”) are included. Since there are almost 
180 in Germany, this variable is likely to capture the local situation on the labor market quite 
accurately. However, the SOEP includes a variable for the state a household lives in, but no 
information on smaller geographical areas in the official version of the dataset. Non-public 
information on the households’ zip codes is available from the German Institute for Economic 
Research (DIW), according to which households can be assigned to their employment office 
districts.
8 When estimating the layoff probability, we also include information on dependent 
children living in the household, since this characteristics might influence the layoff decision of a 
firm which has to take into account social criteria as agreed with the works council. In our 
sample, 5% of the West German workers experienced at least one dismissal during the 
observation period, whereas 12% were dismissed at least once in East Germany. Whereas the 
explanatory variables are taken from information on the current year, the payoff variables refer 
to future periods. To take into account both short-term, and medium-term effects, alternative 
outcome variables are constructed for the event taking place in the subsequent year, within the 
next two years, and within the next three years. 
 
 
                                                           
7 There is a possibility that the distinction between layoffs and quits is not clear-cut, as some workers might try to 
take actions to be dismissed by their employer in order to be eligible for unemployment benefits. In the case of 
voluntary quits, benefits are not paid from the beginning of the unemployment spell.  
8 Due to the sensitivity of the data analysis at the zip code level, all analyses involving such data have been 
conducted at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), under special data protection requirements. Discussion Papers   535 
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4.  Trends in Paid and Unpaid Overtime  
The average standard workweek of the West German workers in our sample was about 38.4 
hours in 1993, and decreased only slightly during the 1990s to 38.3 hours in 2004. The following 
graphs and tables show time trends for paid and unpaid overtime, which differ substantially 
during the past decade.
9 In East Germany, the contractual working time fell from 40.1 hours to 
39.5 hours, which lead to a slight narrowing of the gap. In both East and West Germany, the 
incidence of paid overtime has substantially fallen, whereas unpaid overtime gained relative 
importance. Figure 1 shows the incidence of paid and unpaid overtime for skilled and unskilled 
blue-collar and white-collar workers separately, since the compensation form of extra hours 
differs dramatically between skill groups. This might be explained by the difference in union 
coverage, but also by differences in job tasks and workplace characteristics. The graphs in the 
top panel show a sharp decline in paid extra hours for blue-collar workers during the last decade.  
As a percentage of the total number of employees, almost 50% of skilled and unskilled blue-
collar workers reported paid overtime hours in the early 1990s, whereas this incidence was only 
about 20% in 2004. The fraction of blue-collar workers who perform unpaid hours has hardly 
changed, and is still lower than paid overtime, at a level around 5%. White-collar workers have a 
clearly higher incidence of unpaid hours, as can be seen in the bottom panel. The percentage of 
West German skilled white-collar workers with unpaid overtime remained fairly stable during 
the observation period, and increased only slightly to 25% in 2004, whereas the incidence of paid 
overtime for this worker group decreased from a level of 15% to 5% in 2004. In contrast, among 
unskilled white-collar workers in West Germany, the fraction of both unpaid and paid workers 
fluctuated rather strongly. In the early 1990s, less than 5% of all unskilled white-collar workers 
provided unpaid hours for free, whereas this percentage amounted to 30% in 2003, and was 
again reduced to 20% in 2004. Similarly, the incidence of paid overtime for this worker group 
has shown to be quite unstable, as it moved in the opposite direction of unpaid overtime in most 
of the observed years. In East Germany, skilled white-collar workers experienced a small decline 
in their unpaid overtime incidence, whereas the percentage of unskilled white-collar workers 
with unpaid hours sharply increased by the end of the 1990s, but recently returned to its previous 
level. In both skill groups, the fraction of workers with paid overtime declined to below 5%. 
 
                                                           
9 All descriptive statistics are weighted using cross-sectional sample weights. Discussion Papers   535 




Figure 1:  Paid and Unpaid Overtime Incidence According to Skill Group (1993-2004) 
 



























Source: SOEP, 1993-2004 (own calculations) 
Sample: German male and female full-time employees, age 20-60, civil servants and self-employed persons excluded. The incidence 
refers to the percentage of all employees. Data are weighted using cross-sectional sample weights. 
 
 
In addition to the fraction of unpaid overtime workers, it is important to consider the number of 
overtime hours. Table 1 shows how unpaid overtime in Germany is distributed among workers in 
different occupation groups. The numbers show that the majority of workers supplies relatively 
few unpaid extra hours, regardless of their occupation. The average amount of unpaid overtime 
hours is clearly highest for managers in both East and West Germany. Whereas in West 
Germany, professionals and elementary workers put in high levels of long hours, the occupation 
groups with a high level of unpaid overtime in East Germany are managers, plant and machine 
operators, and technicians. It is shown that extensive workweeks are most prevalent for 
managers, professionals, and elementary workers in the West. In East Germany, managers, 
technicians, and plant and machine operators work extremely long hours, and at a higher level 
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Table 1:  Distribution of Unpaid Overtime Hours According to Occupation 
   West Germany   East Germany 
 Percentile  Percentile 
Occupation 
 Average  
 Hours  25 th  50 th  75 th  95 th 
 Average 
 Hours  25 th  50 th  75 th  95 th 
Managers  6.98 3.3 5.8 9.3 16.4 7.37 2.3 5.8  10.5  21.0 
Professionials  6.51 3.5 4.7 9.3 17.5 5.13 1.9 4.7 7.0  14.0 
Technicians  4.05 0.9 3.0 5.6 11.7 5.85 1.9 4.7 8.2  18.7 
Clerks  4.02 1.2 3.0 4.7 11.7 4.78 2.3 3.7 5.8  11.7 
Service/Sales  Workers  4.57 1.4 3.3 6.5 14.0 5.22 1.9 3.5 7.5  14.0 
Craft  Workers  4.56 1.9 3.7 5.6 14.5 3.94 0.0 2.8 5.8  11.7 
Plant/Machine  Operators  4.40 0.9 2.8 7.0 14.0 6.80 0.0 3.5  11.7  23.1 
Elementary  Workers  5.99 3.3 4.7 9.3 16.4 4.67 2.3 3.5 7.0 9.3 
Source: SOEP, 1993-2004 (own calculations) 
Sample: German male and female full-time employees with unpaid overtime, age 20-60, civil servants and self-employed persons 
excluded. Data are weighted using cross-sectional sample weights. 
 
The importance of unpaid overtime relative to all other compensation forms is shown in Table 2, 
which presents the fraction of workers with unpaid, paid, leisure compensated, and partially 
paid/partially leisure compensated overtime as percentage of all employees with extra hours. In 
West Germany, the fraction of unpaid overtime workers has clearly increased during the 
observation period, whereas a slightly decreasing fraction of overtime workers receive no 
compensation for their extra hours in East Germany. East and West German workers experience 
the common trend of a decline in paid overtime, which was reduced from a share of almost 30% 
in 1993 to 10% in 2004. In contrast, working time accounts are of growing importance. Leisure 
compensation was the most prevalent compensation form in 1993, and has an even higher share 
in the most recent year. However, leisure compensated extra hours are supposed to be taken as 
time-off at a later point in time and are hence considered as transitory overtime. Since the mid-
1990s, the prevalent type of definite extra hours is clearly unpaid overtime. 
 
Table 2:  Shares of Overtime Compensation (in %) 
  Year  1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
West Germany                                 
Unpaid  0.21  0.21 0.20 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.28 
Paid  0.28  0.25 0.25 0.22 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.12 
Leisure  0.30  0.30 0.32 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.39 
partly  paid/  leisure  0.20  0.23 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.21 
E a s t   G e r m a n y              
Unpaid  0.21  0.24 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.17 
Paid  0.27  0.26 0.26 0.26 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.10 
Leisure  0.34  0.31 0.32 0.33 0.40 0.39 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.49 0.50 0.50 
partly  paid/leisure  0.19  0.19 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.26 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.22 
Source: SOEP, 1993-2004 (own calculations). 
Sample: German male and female full-time employees working overtime, aged 20-60, civil servants and self-employed persons 
excluded. Data are weighted using cross-sectional sample weights. 
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Some of the theories discussed above, such as the theory of deferred compensation, the 
tournament model, or the signaling theory, predict a decline in unpaid overtime hours with 
increasing tenure. The use of unpaid overtime to show effort, to compete with other workers, or 
to signal higher productivity, might be more relevant during the first years of employment within 
a firm, and is stopped once the future payoff is obtained. Therefore, Figure 2 shows the amount 
of unpaid hours for workers in different occupations and for different lengths of job tenure 
averaged over all employees. The graph reveals that there is indeed a negative trend in unpaid 
hours with increasing spell length. This is particularly true for West German managers who work 
on average three unpaid hours per week at the beginning of their career, whereas the average is 
only one weekly overtime hour for managers with 20 or more years of tenure. In East Germany, 
newly employed managers perform even more unpaid hours, and increase their unpaid overtime 
supply up to 10 years of tenure, before average unpaid hours decline in later years. Similarly, 
professionals have a downward trend in unpaid hours, which is, however, by far weaker than that 
of managers. Clerks show an exceptionally increase in average unpaid overtime towards the end 
of their career, after they have been employed for 30 or more years by the same firm. 
 
Lastly, we are interested in the descriptive evidence on the link between unpaid overtime hours 
and future payoffs, which will be the focus of the econometric analysis below. Figure 3 shows 
the fraction of workers who experience an excess growth in their labor income (left hand panel), 
as well as the percentage of workers who will be promoted within the three subsequent years 
(right hand panel). All percentages are shown for different amounts of unpaid overtime hours 
and different occupations. In most of the occupation groups in West Germany, workers with a 
positive amount of unpaid extra hours have a higher incidence of excess earnings growth, 
although for some worker groups the incidence is declining for excessively long hours. The 
strongest difference seems to arise between elementary workers with and without unpaid 
overtime:  whereas  almost 30% of workers without unpaid overtime experience excess wage 
growth within the three subsequent years, this percentage is already 60% for workers with up to 
5 weekly unpaid hours. 
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Figure 2:  Average Unpaid Overtime Hours According to Tenure and Occupations 
  

















Source: SOEP, 1993-2004 (own calculations) 
Sample: German male and female full-time employees, age 20-60, civil servants and  
self-employed persons excluded. The amount of weekly hours is averaged over all workers.  
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In East Germany, the link between unpaid overtime and wage growth does not seem to be as 
strong as in West Germany. However, in the group of clerks and service and sales workers, the 
fraction of excess wage growth workers is three times higher for workers with 11 to 15 hours of 
overtime than for workers without unpaid extra hours. The incidence of promotion also seems to 
be related to the amount of unpaid overtime hours. Whereas West German managers with more 
than 20 unpaid extra hours per week have the highest fraction of promoted workers, the 
percentage is highest for managers working 11 to 15 unpaid hours in East Germany. The 
incidence of dismissal for different occupations and unpaid overtime levels is displayed in Figure 
4. which reveals that for some occupations, workers with more unpaid overtime hours have a 
higher percentage of layoffs in the three subsequent years. This may indicate that the supply of 
unpaid overtime does not prevent a future job loss. However, this requires further analysis which 
will follow hereafter.  
 
Figure 4:  Incidence of Dismissal According to Occupations and Unpaid Overtime  























Source: SOEP, 1993-2004 (own calculations) 
Sample: German male and female full-time employees, age 20-60, civil servants and  
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5. Econometric  Analysis 
5.1.   Binary Choice Model  
We estimate the effect of unpaid overtime hours on the probability of obtaining a future payoff 
by using a model of the following structure (see also Greene, 2000):  
it it it i z t i ov x y ε γ β α + + + = + ' '
*
, ,                 (1) 
where 
*
, z t i y +  is the latent propensity of the individual i to get a payoff in the future period t+z, 
with z=1,2,3. Whereas t+1 refers to the subsequent year, t+2 and t+3 refer to the future periods 
within the two and three subsequent years. xit  is a vector of individual and employer 
characteristics, and ovit the weekly unpaid overtime hours worked by the individual at time t. αi 
is the individual specific effect, β and γ are parameters to be estimated, and εit denotes the error 
term which is distributed with mean 0 and variance σε
2. Therefore, whereas the dependent 
variable is measured at time t+z, all independent variables are measured at time t. As 
*
, z t i y +  is a 


















+          ( 2 )  
Assuming an underlying logistic distribution for  it ε , we get the following probability model: 
) ' ' exp( 1
) ' ' exp(
) 1 ( Pr ,
it it i
it it i







= = +  
 
In the first version of the logit model, the future payoff will take the form of excess earnings 
growth in the future, whereas in the second version, we will estimate the probability of a future 
promotion. In a third version, we use future layoff as the dependent variable.
10  
 
Conditional on unobserved individual specific heterogeneity, the outcomes are assumed to be 
independent. By using the panel structure of the data one can control for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity that might bias results from cross-sectional analyses. Here, the model will be 
estimated with two different specifications. The first is a pooled logit model which takes the 
individual specific effect ai to be identical for all persons, therefore being a constant term. 
Second, a random effects logit model will be used, where αi is allowed to differ across 
individuals but is assumed to be constant over time. It hence accounts for intrinsic differences in 
                                                           
10 The Logit model is used for convenience, as the exponentiated form of the coefficient can be interpreted as the 
odds ratio. 
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tastes to unpaid overtime work and in other unobserved explanatory variables. The individual 
specific effect αi  is assumed to be randomly distributed across individuals and not to be 
correlated with the vector of covariates. If the individual effect αi is correlated with the 
explanatory variables, a fixed effects approach would be required. However, averaging out the 
individual effects is not possible in limited dependent variable models due to their nonlinear 
nature. Therefore, we use the conditional maximum likelihood estimator by Chamberlain (1980) 
with the likelihood function being conditional upon a set of statistics ti which are sufficient for 
αi. In this estimator, the behavior of individuals without any change in the outcome variable 
would be completely captured by their individual effect αi. Therefore, only workers with at least 
one change in the payoff variable are relevant for the estimation, which leads to a considerable 
restriction of the dataset. Hence, due to the limited number of workers who experience a 
dismissal or a promotion at least once in the observation period, the fixed effects logit model is 
only applied with excess earnings growth as a dependent variable. With excess earnings growth 
as binary outcome variable, the Hausman test will be used to test for the presence of individual 
specific effects. In the absence of individual specific effects, both the Chamberlain estimator and 
the standard logit maximum likelihood estimator are consistent, whereas the former is 
inefficient. However, in the presence of individual specific effects, only the fixed effects 
estimator is consistent.  
 
5.2.    Sample Selection Model  
The estimation of the probability of excess earnings growth and promotion involves a potential 
bias arising from non-random sample selection. Career advancement in form of promotion and 
wage growth can only be observed for workers who stay in their firms for the considered future 
periods. However, it might well be the case that workers with a lower probability of promotion 
or pay rise are more likely to leave the firm due to dismissals or because they find a better job 
match in another firm. Therefore, persons are not randomly assigned to the future sample of 
workers for which promotions and changes in earnings can be observed. As a consequence, the 
error term might be correlated with the other explanatory variables and the estimates of the logit 
model might be biased. To correct for this selectivity bias, the probability of career advancement 
will be estimated in two steps. The first step is a reduced form selection model to estimate the 
probability of staying in the firm for the relevant future period. The explanatory variables are 
chosen to represent either the firm’s choice to layoff a worker, or the worker’s choice to leave 
the firm. In addition to variables used in the second step logit model, dummies for dependent 
children of different age categories and regional unemployment rates are included as covariates. 
Exemplary Probit estimates of the probability of staying in the same firm for West German 
workers are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. In the second step, the predicted values of the 
inverse Mills ratios are used to estimate an augmented form of equation (1) with the probability Discussion Papers   535 




of a future promotion and excess wage growth as alternative outcome variables. This correction 
for sample selection controls for both, self-selection into and out of the firm, and yields 
consistent parameter estimates of equation (1). Since reported standard errors are inappropriate 
due to the estimated values of the Mills ratios in the first stage, standard errors will be corrected 
(Heckman, 1979). Discussion Papers   535 




The logit estimates yield coefficients that are difficult to interpret, as they give the size of the 
change in the log of the odds, which results from a one unit change in the independent variable. 
However, their exponentiated form can be interpreted as the odds ratio, which is the probability 
of the event taking place divided by the probability of the event not taking place. Odds ratios 
greater than one derive from positive estimation coefficients, whereas odds ratios smaller than 
one arise from negative effects of a change in the independent variable on the probability of the 
outcome.
11 The following tables report only the odds ratios of the logit estimates, and do not 
additionally display the logit coefficients. To ensure consistency even in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity for individuals over time, robust standard errors are computed. The z statistics, 
which are reported in parentheses, correspond to the null hypothesis of no effect. The following 
tables show only the results for the working hours variables without reporting odds ratios of all 
independent variables, although all of the models are full-specified. The pooled logit estimates of 
all covariates for the probability of excess earnings growth, promotion, and layoff in the next 
year for West German workers can be seen in Table A3 in the Appendix. The likelihood of an 
excess earnings growth is positively associated with the number of desired working hours for all 
West Germans. Current monthly earnings including extra payments are highly significant but 
have almost no impact. For male workers, holding a temporary job and working in the wood and 
paper or banking and insurance industry is positively related to the probability of excess earnings 
growth, whereas working in the public sector affects the likelihood negatively. Furthermore, 
females who work in the chemical industry and in service and sales, have a lower probability of 
an excess earnings growth. The promotion probability for both males and females in West 
Germany is positively affected by a recent job change and by being employed in firms with more 
than five employees. Tenure has a positive but decreasing effect on the likelihood of promotion. 
In addition, male workers are more likely to be promoted with increasing desired working hours 
and years of education. The selectivity variable is positive and highly significant for male 
workers, whereas it is statistically significant only at the 10% level for female workers. The large 
effects of the inverse Mill’s ratios for both men and women indicate that estimating the 
promotion probability without the correction for sample selection may yield inconsistent 
estimates of the true odds ratios for the likelihood of promotion. The promotion probability is 
lowest for women in elementary occupations, highest in the hotel and restaurant sector, and 
significantly higher for skilled than for unskilled blue-collar and white-collar female workers. 
The probability of layoff is positively affected by a recent job change for both men and women, 
whereas working in the public sector clearly decreases the likelihood of dismissal. Male workers 
have a lower probability of being laid off with increasing tenure and a higher layoff probability 
                                                           
11 Since the odds ratio equals e
β




 = 1). 
 Discussion Papers   535 
6  Results 
 
20 
is found for skilled blue-collar workers with respect unskilled blue-collar workers, which are 
used as the reference group.  
 
6.1.   Excess Earnings Growth 
The estimates of the probability of an excess growth in gross monthly earnings including extra 
payments are shown in Table 3 for East and West German men and women. In addition to the 
amount of unpaid overtime hours, other compensation forms of overtime, contractual hours and 
further control variables are included in all of the estimates. In the pooled logit model, the odds 
ratio of unpaid overtime are greater than one in all estimates. However, the estimates of unpaid 
overtime are only significant for West German workers but not statistically significant for East 
German males and females. Whereas an increase in unpaid overtime by one hour raises the odds 
ratio of experiencing an excess earnings growth in the next year by about 4% for West German 
males, the increase is 8% for females. For both West German sub-samples, the positive and 
highly significant effect on the excess growth probability holds after controlling for unobserved 
worker heterogeneity in the random effects model. Furthermore, for female workers, the effect of 
unpaid overtime is only significant in the estimates of the probability of an excess earnings 
growth in the next, or within the two subsequent years, whereas for male workers, unpaid 
overtime hours are also associated in a significantly positive way with the likelihood of 
experiencing an excess wage growth within the three subsequent years. However, when applying 
the fixed effects logit model and therefore allowing for correlation between the individual 
specific effect and the covariates, all estimates of the unpaid overtime coefficient become 
insignificant. The only persistent significant positive effect arises from partially leisure 
compensated/partially paid overtime hours in the estimation for West German females. The 
impact of mixed compensated overtime hours on the likelihood of excess earnings growth was of 
a similar size as the unpaid overtime effect in the previous model specifications. According to 
the random effects logit model, an hourly increase in partially leisure compensated/partially paid 
overtime raises the odds ratio of experiencing an excess growth in earnings the next year by 
about 14%. For West German males, paid and leisure compensated overtime hours have a 
negative impact on the likelihood of experiencing an excess earnings growth in the fixed effects 
logit model. In the East German sample of male workers, there are no significant results of the 
working hours coefficients, while for women, both paid and partially leisure 
compensated/partially paid overtime is significantly associated with the probability of an excess 
wage growth in a positive way after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in the random 
effects model. Using the likelihood ratio test to check the pooled against the random effects 
model supports the random effects logit model in all models. However, according to the 
Hausman test, the fixed effects model is the preferred specification. 
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Table 3:  Overtime and Excess Earnings Growth Probability: Logit Estimate Odds Ratios 
  Pooled Logit  Random Effects Logit  Fixed Effects Logit 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 
West  German  Men           
    Unpaid  1.041 1.063 1.065 1.039 1.062 1.074 0.984 1.001 1.009 
 (2.63)**  (4.27)**  (4.02)** (2.36)*  (3.25)** (3.15)** (0.51)  (0.03)  (0.20) 
    Paid  0.990 0.992 1.001 0.985 0.971 0.985 0.939 0.937 0.997 
  (0.60) (0.52) (0.04) (0.82) (1.49) (0.71)  (2.36)*  (2.27)*  (0.11) 
    Leisure  0.963 1.008 1.012 0.958 1.000 1.007 0.917 0.962 1.009 
  (1.40) (0.37) (0.57) (1.72) (0.01) (0.29)  (2.67)**  (1.24) (0.26) 
    Leisure/paid  1.045 1.060 1.067 1.041 1.046 1.060 0.964 0.983 1.037 
 (2.70)**  (3.84)**  (4.21)** (2.41)*  (2.48)*  (2.77)** (1.56)  (0.69)  (1.22) 
Log-Likelihood    -2545.9 -2828.3 -2714.9 -2542.3  -2767.4  -2588.2  -949.6 -902.3 -707.1 
Observations  7,802 6,560 5,542 7,802 6,635 5,644 3,659 3,584 3,140 
E a s t   G e r m a n   M e n           
    Unpaid  1.019 1.019 1.026 1.021 1.024 1.040 0.956 0.935 0.958 
  (0.90) (1.04) (1.39) (0.99) (1.11) (1.35) (1.13) (1.57) (0.82) 
    Paid  1.002 1.001 1.023 1.000 0.988 1.018 0.930 0.947 1.039 
  (0.09) (0.05) (1.14) (0.02) (0.50) (0.65) (1.85) (1.45) (0.91) 
    Leisure  0.951 0.989 1.012 0.949 0.992 1.036 0.950 0.946 0.985 
  (1.63) (0.40) (0.47) (1.51) (0.26) (0.99) (1.11) (1.30) (0.32) 
    Leisure/paid  1.028 1.027 1.040 1.027 1.022 1.022 1.012 0.981 0.978 
  (1.31) (1.29) (1.80) (1.17) (0.88) (0.68) (0.35) (0.48) (0.46) 
Log-Likelihood  -1386.9 -1503.0 -1415.0 -1386.1  -1482.7  -1334.0  -469.7 -463.6 -338.4 
Observations  4,206 3,449 2,881 4,206 3,489 2,943 2,043 1,960 1,679 
West  German  Women           
    Unpaid  1.084 1.075 1.035 1.084 1.101 1.055 0.993 1.024 1.070 
  (2.59)**  (2.06)* (0.92) (2.26)*  (2.19)* (1.04)  (0.10)  (0.36)  (0.84) 
    Paid  1.060 1.007 0.922 1.060 1.015 0.929 1.120 1.099 0.929 
  (0.79) (0.09) (0.78) (0.80) (0.18) (0.77) (1.04) (0.81) (0.60) 
    Leisure  1.052 1.044 1.017 1.052 1.057 1.030 1.022 0.995 1.037 
  (1.69) (1.57) (0.54) (1.62) (1.53) (0.68) (0.35) (0.08) (0.45) 
    Leisure/paid  1.102 1.122 1.109 1.102 1.139 1.126 1.142 1.144 1.088 
 (2.78)**  (3.21)**  (2.40)*  (2.97)** (3.15)** (2.24)*  (2.20)*  (1.73)  (0.96) 
Log-Likelihood  -897.0 -995.7 -918.4 -896.6 -981.9 -890.3 -230.8 -241.7 -197.1 
Observations  3,466 2,745 2,192 3,467 2,773 2,230 1,273 1,227 1,012 
East  German  Women           
    Unpaid  1.012 1.024 1.038 1.013 1.045 1.077 1.046 1.077 1.115 
  (0.31) (0.58) (1.01) (0.36) (1.07) (1.72) (0.72) (1.21) (1.57) 
    Paid  1.110 1.047 1.041 1.114 1.052 1.044 0.947 0.889 1.283 
  (2.37)*  (0.96) (0.83)  (2.30)*  (0.83) (0.51) (0.55) (1.01) (1.70) 
    Leisure  1.031 1.027 1.022 1.031 1.026 1.011 1.012 0.980 0.988 
  (0.88) (0.77) (0.60) (0.86) (0.58) (0.19) (0.20) (0.29) (0.13) 
    Leisure/paid  1.086 1.029 1.052 1.092 1.030 1.065 1.037 0.991 1.047 
  (2.67)**  (0.90) (1.64)  (2.62)** (0.72) (1.27) (0.59) (0.14) (0.65) 
Log-Likelihood  -830.6 -880.8 -839.9 -830.0 -859.9 -794.1 -231.3 -216.1 -163.9 
Observations  2,981 2,450 2,062 2,989 2,475 2,098 1,227 1,159  976 
 
Source:  SOEP, 1993-2004.  
Sample: German full-time employees, aged 20-65, civil servants and self-employed persons excluded 
Note:  The regression model is full-specified, independent variables include individual and job characteristics as well as region   
and year dummies. 
*significant at the 5% level, 
**significant at the 1% level 
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6.2. Promotion  Probability 
Table 4 presents the estimates of the probability of promotion with the odds ratios of unpaid 
hours and other compensation forms of overtime. In the pooled logit model, the odds ratios of 
unpaid overtime are smaller than one in the estimates for West German men and in some of the 
estimates for female workers. However, there is no significant coefficient on unpaid overtime in 
the pooled logit specification. Most of the other compensation forms are equally insignificant 
with the exception of paid overtime and partially leisure compensated/partially paid overtime in 
the estimates for West German males. Whereas an increase in paid overtime by one hour is 
associated with a 8.5% decrease in the odds ratio of being promoted within the three subsequent 
years, an hourly increase in the mixed compensated overtime implies a 10%  higher odds ratio of 
experiencing a promotion within the next, the two subsequent, or the three subsequent years.  
 
When controlling for unobserved heterogeneity by using a random effects logit specification, the 
effect of unpaid overtime becomes statistically significant at the 5% level for East German male 
workers. For this worker group, an increase in unpaid overtime by one hour per week adds 26% 
to the odds ratio of experiencing a promotion within the two subsequent years. For the same time 
horizon, an hourly increase in unpaid overtime is associated with a 12% rise in the odds ratio for 
West German women but this effect is only significant at the 10% level. For all other workers, 
there is no association between unpaid overtime and the likelihood of promotion prospects. 
While for West German male workers, partially leisure compensated/partially paid overtime 
hours have a positive impact on the promotion probability, purely leisure compensated overtime 
hours raise the promotion prospects of West German females. However, the coefficient of leisure 
compensated overtime is negative and statistically significant in the random effects estimation 
for East German women, when unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for. Hence, with 
exception of East German male workers, there is very limited evidence for a positive relationship 
between unpaid overtime hours and promotion probability. Depending on the worker group, 
other compensation forms of overtime seem to be equally important, which is especially true for 
partially leisure compensated/partially paid and purely leisure compensated overtime.  Discussion Papers   535 




Table 4:  Overtime and Promotion Probability: Logit Estimate Odds Ratios 
  Pooled Logit  Random Effects Logit 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 
W e s t   G e r m a n   M e n         
    Unpaid  0.998 0.990 0.986 0.987 0.960 0.916 
  (0.04) (0.28) (0.46) (0.27) (0.65) (1.43) 
    Paid  0.948 0.911 0.915 0.949 0.908 0.933 
  (0.77) (1.84)  (2.04)*  (0.77) (1.25) (0.80) 
    Leisure  1.044 1.045 1.039 1.035 1.047 1.026 
  (1.10) (1.15) (1.12) (0.73) (0.79) (0.36) 
    Leisure/paid  1.092 1.106 1.080 1.090 1.110 1.079 
  (2.98)** (3.97)** (2.96)**  (2.53)*  (2.40)*  (1.59) 
Log-Likelihood    -508.5 -675.6 -742.7 -502.4 -588.7 -552.0 
Observations  8,350 7,021 5,856 8,527 7,167 5,949 
E a s t   G e r m a n   M e n         
    Unpaid  1.034 1.045 1.016 1.034 1.256 0.929 
  (0.66) (1.27) (0.46) (0.58)  (2.02)*  (0.54) 
    Paid  1.043 1.057 1.075 1.043 1.080 0.984 
  (0.55) (1.12) (1.69) (0.68) (0.73) (0.14) 
    Leisure  1.032 1.079 1.082 1.032 0.998 1.185 
  (0.43) (1.37) (1.62) (0.36) (0.01) (0.96) 
    Leisure/paid  0.901 0.985 0.997 0.901 0.758 0.955 
  (0.95) (0.21) (0.04) (0.78) (1.42) (0.15) 
Log-Likelihood  -172.3 -247.7 -233.0 -172.4 -207.1 -175.4 
Observations  4,105 3,356 2,585 4,449 3,627 2,993 
West  German  Women        
    Unpaid  0.900 1.003 0.975 0.900 1.117 1.046 
  (1.64) (0.06) (0.57) (1.27) (1.61) (0.46) 
    Paid  0.898 0.771 1.125 0.898 0.695 1.443 
  (0.43) (0.88) (1.12) (0.29) (0.36) (1.48) 
    Leisure  1.070 1.062 1.082 1.070 1.256 1.420 
  (1.28) (1.04) (1.48) (1.13)  (2.22)*  (2.51)* 
    Leisure/paid  0.990 0.971 0.898 0.990 0.838 0.786 
  (0.16) (0.45) (1.27) (0.13) (0.94) (1.15) 
Log-Likelihood  -212.7 -266.4 -271.0 -213.7 -240.3 -215.4 
Observations  3,260 2,695 2,073 3,786 3,027 2,361 
E a s t   G e r m a n   W o m e n         
    Unpaid  1.006 0.988 1.034 1.006 0.914 0.854 
  (0.08) (0.13) (0.28) (0.05) (0.34) (0.49) 
    Paid  1.149 1.086 1.144 1.149 1.237 1.831 
  (1.50) (0.94) (1.68) (0.99) (0.64) (1.48) 
    Leisure  0.812 0.933 1.031 0.811 0.716 1.082 
  (1.53) (0.73) (0.35) (1.26)  (2.04)*  (0.58) 
    Leisure/paid  1.071 1.076 0.975 1.071 0.797 0.860 
  (1.08) (0.93) (0.30) (0.85) (1.38) (0.91) 
Log-Likelihood  -144.5 -201.2 -202.7 -144.2 -167.1 -151.7 
Observations  2,480 2,045 1,605 3,296 2,688 2,191 
Source:   SOEP, 1993-2004.  
Sample:  German full-time employees, aged 20-65, civil servants and self-employed persons excluded 
Note:       The regression model is full-specified, independent variables include individual and job characteristics  
as well as region and year dummies. 
*significant at the 5% level, 
**significant at the 1% level 
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6.3.   Layoff Probability 
The pooled and random effects estimates of the likelihood of being laid off in the next year, 
within the next two years, and within the next three years, are shown in Table 5. Except for the 
estimates for female workers in East Germany, the odds ratios of unpaid overtime hours are 
greater than one in the pooled logit model which indicates a positive relationship between unpaid 
hours and the probability of dismissal in these estimates. Yet, the positive coefficients on unpaid 
hours are not highly statistically significant. The greatest significance occurs in the estimates for 
West German females, where an hourly increase in unpaid overtime implies a 6% higher odds 
ratio of being laid off within the three subsequent years at the 10% level. However, the odds 
ratios in the estimates for East German women are less than zero and significant at the 5% and 
1% level. For East German females, an increase in unpaid overtime by one weekly hour is 
associated with a 10% lower odds ratio of experiencing a dismissal next year, within the two 
subsequent, or the three subsequent years. The negative relationship between working hours and 
the future layoff probability holds also for paid overtime in the case of East German males and 
for partially leisure compensated/partially paid overtime for West German females. 
 
In the random effects estimates, the negative relationship between unpaid overtime and the 
probability of dismissal persists for East German females at the 10% significance level, and 
becomes even more significant, when the subsequent two periods are considered. Increasing the 
workweek by one unpaid hour is associated with a 25% lower odds ratio of dismissal within the 
next two years for East German women. However, when controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity in the random effects specification, the odds ratio of unpaid overtime becomes 
significantly greater than one in the estimation for West German men. For West German male 
workers, an increase in unpaid overtime by one hour implies a 9% higher odds ratio of being 
dismissed within the next two or three years. A somewhat weaker, but also positive effect can be 
observed for East German male workers. At the same time, partially leisure 
compensated/partially paid overtime hours as well as purely leisure compensated overtime hours 
significantly reduce the risk of job loss in the next year for the worker group of West German 
males. To summarize, for male workers, unpaid extra hours do not seem to prevent but rather to 
entail a future layoff, whereas other compensation forms of overtime have more favorable 
consequences for male workers who supply additional hours. However, the future payoff in form 
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Table 5:  Overtime and Layoff Probability: Logit Estimate Odds Ratios 
  Pooled Logit  Random Effects Logit 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 
W e s t   G e r m a n   M e n         
    Unpaid  1.022 1.029 1.030 1.030 1.089 1.086 
  (0.82) (1.37) (1.53) (1.05)  (2.55)*  (2.12)* 
    Paid  0.940 0.956 0.972 0.943 0.977 1.034 
  (1.65) (1.76) (1.34) (1.53) (0.65) (0.90) 
    Leisure  0.911 1.004 0.986 0.906 1.030 0.987 
  (1.88) (0.11) (0.36) (1.68) (0.66) (0.25) 
    Leisure/paid  0.890 0.949 0.964 0.889 0.953 0.948 
  (1.84) (1.32) (1.20)  (2.03)*  (1.01) (0.94) 
Log-Likelihood  -837.9 -1238.9  -1458.9 -836.4 -1133.5  -1188.8 
Observations  10,887  9,569 8,427  10,887  9,583 8,469 
E a s t   G e r m a n   M e n         
    Unpaid  1.027 1.004 1.009 1.026 1.007 1.058 
  (1.23) (0.20) (0.54) (1.17) (0.25) (1.88) 
    Paid  0.963 0.961 0.961 0.963 0.971 0.979 
  (1.46) (1.86)  (2.22)*  (1.34) (1.06) (0.71) 
    Leisure  0.989 1.023 1.020 0.988 1.057 1.123 
  (0.30) (0.87) (0.84) (0.33) (1.52)  (2.94)** 
    Leisure/paid  1.017 1.003 1.007 1.018 1.015 1.042 
  (0.64) (0.11) (0.35) (0.65) (0.48) (1.23) 
Log-Likelihood -1145.7  -1603.3  -1814.6 -1145.0 -1509.7 -1547.0 
Observations  6,001 5,343 4,744 6,028 5,385 4,823 
West  German  Women        
    Unpaid  1.056 1.057 1.068 1.055 1.017 1.196 
  (1.62) (1.80) (1.93) (1.25) (0.17) (1.71) 
    Paid  0.926 1.061 1.022 0.928 1.117 1.166 
  (0.63) (0.78) (0.30) (0.53) (0.58) (0.77) 
    Leisure  0.900 1.018 0.997 0.900 1.033 0.888 
  (1.31) (0.38) (0.08) (1.27) (0.46) (1.37) 
    Leisure/paid  0.900 0.883 0.886 0.899 0.830 0.863 
  (1.46) (1.94)  (2.03)*  (1.10) (1.67) (1.14) 
Log-Likelihood  -383.6 -545.4 -594.8 -382.9 -496.6 -458.7 
Observations  5,081 4,446 3,878 5,148 4,491 3,936 
E a s t   G e r m a n   W o m e n         
    Unpaid  0.909 0.900 0.940 0.908 0.746 0.921 
  (2.03)*  (3.09)**  (2.15)*  (1.79) (3.73)** (1.30) 
    Paid  1.093 1.063 1.038 1.094 1.275 1.188 
  (1.57) (1.41) (0.91) (1.78) (1.71) (1.54) 
    Leisure  1.024 0.945 0.974 1.024 0.871 1.169 
  (0.52) (1.29) (0.74) (0.47) (1.94) (1.66) 
    Leisure/paid  1.000 0.981 0.971 1.001 1.023 1.074 
  (0.01) (0.48) (0.88) (0.02) (0.29) (0.89) 
Log-Likelihood  -570.7 -813.0 -910.9 -570.2 -718.2 -693.4 
Observations  4,462 3,961 3,502 4,462 3,968 3,528 
 
Source:   SOEP, 1993-2004.  
Sample:  German full-time employees, aged 20-65, civil servants and self-employed persons excluded 
Note:       The regression model is full-specified, independent variables include individual and job characteristics  
as well as region and year dummies. 
*significant at the 5% level, 
**significant at the 1% level 
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6.4.   Robustness Checks and Extensions 
As an extension to the model, we investigate interactions between unpaid overtime hours and 
some of the covariates, since it might well be the case that the effect of unpaid overtime on the 
probability of obtaining a future payoff depends on particular worker, job, or firm characteristics. 
Therefore, we interact unpaid overtime hours with education, occupation groups, firm size, and 
industry, and estimate the probability of an excess earnings growth, promotion, and layoff in the 
next, two subsequent, and three subsequent years. However, since the interaction terms did not 
show to be significant, they will not be reported here. 
 
6.4.1.  Variations in the Sample 
In order to check the robustness of the results, the analysis is modified in several ways. First, the 
sample is restricted to white-collar workers, among whom unpaid overtime is more prevalent. 
White-collar workers are to a lesser extent covered by overtime provisions which result from 
collective bargaining. Furthermore, the different characteristics of white-collar jobs, such as the 
related uncertainty over job task completion times or leadership roles, involve more unpaid 
overtime than it is the case for blue-collar jobs. Moreover, the output of blue-collar workers is 
usually easier to measure, which restricts the need for the approximation of performance with 
working hours, and for incentive provision contracts, such as deferred compensation or 
tournaments. Table 6. shows random effects logit estimates of the probability of an excess 
earnings growth, promotion, and layoff for East and West German male white-collar workers.
12 
The odds ratio of the likelihood of excess earnings is again greater than one and significant only 
for West German males workers. However, this effect would eventually vanish, when using a 
fixed effects logit model, which does not rely on the orthogonality assumption. The coefficients 
on unpaid overtime in the estimation of the promotion probability are not significant at all, 
although in the previous estimates for all workers, a significant positive effect was found for East 
German workers. The impact of a positive relationship between unpaid overtime and the 
probability of job loss for West German males is robust, when only white-collar workers are 
considered. The increase in the workweek by one unpaid extra hour is associated with a 13% 








                                                           
12 The fixed effects Logit model will not be used for the smaller sub-sample of white-collar workers, since the 
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Table 6:  Overtime and Future Payoffs for White-Collar Workers: RE Logit Estimate Odds Ratios 
 West  Germany  East  Germany 
Male  workers  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 
Excess  Earnings  Growth        
    Unpaid  1.027 1.040 1.060 1.006 1.003 1.004 
  (1.52) (1.82)  (2.11)*  (0.27) (0.13) (0.13) 
    Paid  0.993 0.948 0.950 0.951 0.910 1.006 
  (0.25) (1.53) (1.26) (0.79) (1.35) (0.09) 
    Leisure  0.970 1.009 0.997 0.987 1.011 1.018 
  (1.03) (0.29) (0.09) (0.30) (0.26) (0.34) 
    Leisure/paid  1.055 1.059 1.066 1.019 1.005 0.938 
  (2.74)**  (2.54)*  (2.30)*  (0.49) (0.11) (0.96) 
Observations  4,333 3,681 3,117 1,532 1,250 1,037 
P r o m o t i o n           
    Unpaid  0.999 1.015 0.943 0.990 0.998 1.222     
  (0.01) (0.25) (0.70) (0.12) (0.68) (0.09) 
    Paid  1.025 1.022 0.991 1.158 1.562      3.639 
  (0.33) (0.21) (0.07) (1.13) (0.53) (0.14) 
  Leisure  1.096  1.171  1.019  0.931  2.241     4.430   
  (1.73)  (2.14)*  (0.19) (0.54) (0.13) (0.09) 
  Leisure/paid  1.107  1.163  1.113  0.797  2.449    1.357   
  (2.32)*  (2.73)**  (1.59) (0.98) (0.46) (0.04) 
Observations  4,793 4,049 3,341 1,652 1,339 1,096 
L a y o f f         
    Unpaid  1.019 1.127 1.088 1.034 1.048 0.995 
  (0.54)  (2.25)*  (1.37) (1.06) (0.96) (0.10) 
    Paid  0.871 0.795 0.904 1.011 1.100 1.261 
  (1.39) (1.65) (0.85) (0.13) (0.97)  (1.98)* 
    Leisure  0.845 1.103 1.109 0.918 0.942 0.911 
  (1.84) (1.11) (1.14) (0.86) (0.56) (0.92) 
    Leisure/paid  0.811 0.936 0.929 1.011 1.078 0.950 
  (2.07)*  (0.74) (0.81) (0.17) (0.69) (0.40) 
Observations  5,943 5,186 4,545 2,149 1,905 1,685 
Source:   SOEP, 1993-2004.  
Sample:  German full-time employees, aged 20-65, civil servants and self-employed persons excluded 
Note  The regression model is full-specified, independent variables include individual and job characteristics  
    as well as region and year dummies. 
*significant at the 5% level, 
**significant at the 1% level 
 
 
Another modification in the sample is to exclude workers in the public sector as a further check 
of robustness. This might be important with respect to earnings growth and promotions, since 
career advancement in the public sector usually takes place on the grounds of seniority instead of 
on merit.
13 Moreover, the exclusion of the public sector as robustness check might be important, 
when investigating the probability of layoff, since in public firms, the risk of layoff is by far 
lower than in the private sector. As can be seen in Table 7., the results are very similar to the 
results of the estimates, where the public service is included. The positive effects of unpaid 
overtime on excess earnings growth is significant for West German males, but not for East 
                                                           
13 The way how people achieve career advancement might, of course, also differ between companies, depending on 
their institutional background. Whereas some firms might rely on seniority, in other companies, such as U.S. firms, 
promotions and pay rises are more heavily based on merit. Discussion Papers   535 
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German workers, and there is no significant impact of unpaid hours on the probability of 
promotion. Again, the positive coefficients of unpaid overtime in the estimates of the layoff 
probability are significant, and slightly higher than in the previous estimates without excluding 
the public sector.  
 
Table 7:  Overtime and Future Payoffs in the Private Sector: RE Logit Estimate Odds Ratios 
 West  Germany  East  Germany 
Male  workers  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 
Excess  Earnings  Growth        
    Unpaid  1.038 1.055 1.066 1.015 1.025 1.026 
 (2.20)*  (2.71)**  (2.62)**  (0.66)  (1.10)  (0.80) 
    Paid  0.984 0.970 0.986 1.000 0.981 1.012 
  (0.88) (1.50) (0.63) (0.02) (0.77) (0.40) 
    Leisure  0.959 0.998 1.001 0.956 0.968 1.021 
  (1.58) (0.07) (0.04) (1.18) (0.89) (0.49) 
    Leisure/paid  1.040 1.043 1.055 1.018 1.016 1.036 
 (2.28)*  (2.17)*  (2.31)*  (0.71)  (0.59)  (0.95) 
Observations  6,498 5,518 4,678 3,351 2,778 2,336 
Promotion          
    Unpaid  0.953 0.948 0.932 1.028 1.377 0.156 
  (0.80) (0.83) (0.94) (0.34) (1.09) (0.08) 
    Paid  0.964 0.888 0.935 1.078 0.987 0.954 
  (0.51) (1.40) (0.65) (0.97)  (7.44)**  (0.13) 
    Leisure  1.046 1.090 0.996 1.059 1.774 1.989 
  (0.78) (1.18) (0.04) (0.52) (0.90) (0.34) 
    Leisure/paid  1.119 1.117 1.124 0.801 0.999 0.910 
 (2.95)**  (2.33)*  (1.67)  (0.99)  (5.79)**  (0.12) 
Observations  7,054 5,911 4,888 3,505 2,835 2,333 
L a y o f f         
    Unpaid  1.032 1.093 1.106 1.031 1.019 1.081 
  (1.09) (2.54)*  (2.62)**  (1.34)  (0.69) (2.28)* 
    Paid  0.941 0.975 1.030 0.965 0.966 0.966 
  (1.55) (0.70) (0.83) (1.26) (1.20) (1.15) 
    Leisure  0.895 1.035 1.017 0.994 1.077 1.126 
  (1.78) (0.74) (0.34) (0.15) (1.86)  (2.81)** 
    Leisure/paid  0.880 0.954 0.944 1.023 1.021 1.038 
  (2.12)*  (0.99) (1.21) (0.82) (0.68) (1.10) 
Observations  9,125 8,024 7,079 4,823 4,312 3,859 
Source:   SOEP, 1993-2004.  
Sample:  German full-time employees, aged 20-65, civil servants and self-employed persons excluded 
Note  The regression model is full-specified, independent variables include individual and job characteristics  
    as well as region and year dummies. 
*significant at the 5% level, 
**significant at the 1% level 
 
 
Lastly, we restricted the sample to a younger worker group with workers of age 25 to 50. We 
conducted this check of robustness, since elder workers might not largely expect promotions and 
pay rises. However, these estimates did not yield any significant changes in the results. To 
summarize, the results in the main analysis above did not show to be sensitive to variations in the 
sample. Any positive relationship between unpaid overtime and future earnings growth is likely Discussion Papers   535 
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to be driven by unobserved heterogeneity which is correlated with observed characteristics. 
Furthermore, there is only weak evidence for unpaid overtime to be positively associated with 
the likelihood of promotion. However, the negative relationship between unpaid extra hours and 
the probability of a future layoff was found to be robust to variations in the sample. 
 
6.4.2.  Variation in the Measure of Wage Growth 
Another robustness test is to modify the outcome variable of wage growth. The measure of 
excess earnings growth, i.e. growth which is at least one standard deviation higher than the 
average earnings growth of workers in the same job scale in the respective year, is a rather strict 
test. Hence, it will be replaced by a variable for future earnings growth. The use of a continuous 
variable has, furthermore, the advantage that no valuable information is lost by generating 
dummy variables. Therefore, the growth in earnings including extra payments in the next year, 
within the two subsequent years, and within the three subsequent years is computed and 
regressed on the same independent variables as in the model above, using a linear fixed effects 
model. Table 8. shows the results of these estimates for East and West German workers, and 
reveals that not only unpaid hours, but also other compensation forms of overtime are related to 
short-run earnings growth in a significant negative way. The only worker group which seems to 
benefit from currently working extra hours in terms of higher wage growth are West German 
females. However, the negative effects associated with unpaid overtime hours are very small, 
indicating that an increase in weekly unpaid extra hours decreases future earnings growth by less 
than 1%. Therefore, the findings of no significant relationship between unpaid overtime and 
earnings growth within the three subsequent years can be confirmed by changing the wage 
growth measure. 
 
6.4.3.  Unpaid Overtime as Deviation from the Mean 
Another modification of the analysis includes the use of a relative measure of overtime hours. 
This might be important to investigate the tournament character of overtime, as future outcomes 
might well depend on a limited number of available payoffs, and the realization of these payoffs 
may therefore depend on the performance of other workers in the same company. However,  
overtime hours of a respondent’s co-workers are not identified in the SOEP. Therefore, we 
calculate the mean of overtime hours in the same occupation in every year for East and West 
Germany separately. This allows us to use a worker’s deviation from the mean in the worker’s 
industry as explanatory variable for estimates of the probability of excess wage growth, 
promotion, and layoff. 
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Table 8:  Overtime and Future Wage Growth: Fixed Effects Coefficients 
 West  Germany  East  Germany 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 
M a l e   W o r k e r s         
  Unpaid  -0.002  -0.003  -0.007  -0.002  -0.000  -0.005 
  (1.49)  (1.77) (3.48)** (1.09)  (0.04)  (2.25)* 
  Paid  -0.007  -0.010  -0.008  -0.001  -0.007  -0.002 
  (6.30)**  (6.49)**  (4.47)** (0.76) (3.87)** (0.91) 
  Leisure  -0.006  -0.003  -0.005  0.001  -0.002  -0.002 
 (4.43)**  (1.62)  (2.49)*  (0.29)  (0.76)  (0.84) 
  Leisure/paid  -0.003  -0.007  -0.009  0.003  -0.003  -0.002 
 (2.48)*  (4.23)**  (4.93)**  (1.73)  (1.81)  (0.99) 
Observations  7,802 6,495 5,437 4,206 3,419 2,830 
Female  Workers        
  Unpaid  0.003  0.008  -0.001  0.000  0.002  -0.000 
  (1.56)  (3.03)**  (0.29) (0.14) (0.92) (0.04) 
  Paid  -0.004  -0.002  -0.006  -0.004  -0.014  -0.011 
  (1.19) (0.40) (1.09) (1.48)  (4.44)**  (2.75)** 
  Leisure  0.003  0.003  0.002  -0.002  0.001  -0.000 
  (1.56) (1.19) (0.75) (1.28) (0.27) (0.05) 
  Leisure/paid  0.005  0.006  0.003  0.001  -0.001  0.001 
  (2.69)**  (2.03)*  (0.90) (0.68) (0.55) (0.24) 
Observations  3,467 2,715 2,147 2,989 2,433 2,028 
Source:   SOEP, 1993-2004.  
Sample:  German full-time employees, aged 20-65, civil servants and self-employed persons excluded 
Note:       The regression model is full-specified, independent variables include individual and job characteristics  
  as well as region and year dummies. 
*significant at the 5% level, 
**significant at the 1% level 
 
 
Table 9 presents the odds ratios of the random effects logit estimates for male workers. 
Strikingly, the results are very similar to the results of the estimates which include the level of 
unpaid overtime as explanatory variable. For West German male workers, the positive effects of 
unpaid overtime, as deviation from the mean, on excess earnings growth is highly significant for 
all future time periods, whereas this effect is weaker and barely significant for East German 
males. In the estimation of the promotion probability, the deviation from the mean of unpaid 
overtime is significant for East German men. Again, the findings of a positive relationship 
between unpaid overtime and the probability of job loss for West German males is robust, when 
the deviations from the mean of unpaid extra hours are taken into account. The estimates show 
that now the effect is also positive for East German workers. As a result, the findings of the main 
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Table 9:  Deviation from Mean and Future Payoffs: RE Logit Estimate Odds Ratios (Men) 
 West  Germany  East  Germany 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 
Excess  Earnings  Growth       
  Deviation Unpaid Overtime  1.036  1.059  1.0684  1.024  1.028  1.045 
 (2.23)*  (3.20)**  (2.98)**  (1.12)  (1.28)  (1.57) 
Observations  7,802 6,635 5,633 4,206 3,489 2,932 
Promotion          
  Deviation Unpaid Overtime  0.992  0.958  0.909  1.034  1.297  0.9137 
  (0.17) (0.69) (1.34) (0.59)  (2.36)*  (0.62) 
Observations  10,887  9,583 8,469 6,028 5,385 4,823 
Layoff        
  Deviation Unpaid Overtime  1.030  1.085  1.083  1.027  1.012  1.060 
  (1.05)  (2.53) *  (2.19) *  (1.23)  (0.44)  (1.96) * 
Observations  8,527 7,167 5,949 4,449 3,627 2,993 
Source:   SOEP, 1993-2004.  
Sample:  German full-time employees, aged 20-65, civil servants and self-employed persons excluded 
Note:       The regression model is full-specified, independent variables include individual and job characteristics  
as well as region and year dummies. 
*significant at the 5% level, 
**significant at the 1% level 
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7. Conclusion   
The objective of this study was to analyze future consequences of unpaid overtime. To 
investigate whether working hours can be interpreted as an investment, the relationship between 
unpaid overtime and career advancement was examined. Future payoffs of working hours are 
consistent with a number of theories and might be interpreted as returns to firm-specific human 
capital, gift exchange, deferred compensation, prizes in a tournament, or the payment for 
signaling productivity, motivation, or loyalty to the employer. Empirical evidence for future 
payoffs in form of higher wage growth, promotions, and job retention could provide an 
explanation for the supply of uncompensated extra hours. Using data from the SOEP for the 
years 1993 to 2004, we investigated for East and West German male and female full-time 
employees whether a higher number of unpaid extra hours involves a higher probability of 
promotion and excess earnings growth, and a lower probability of layoff in the subsequent years. 
Excess earnings growth was defined as growth, which is at least one standard deviation higher 
than the average earnings growth of workers in the same job scale in the respective year. In our 
pooled, random effects, and fixed effects logit estimates, we only find limited evidence for the 
investment character of unpaid overtime hours. The positive effects of unpaid hours on the 
likelihood of experiencing future excess growth in earnings which are found for West German 
workers, vanish as soon as unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for by applying panel 
estimators. Even when controlling for individual specific effects, unpaid overtime is positively 
associated with the probability of a future promotion for East German men and for West German 
women. However, other compensation forms of overtime, in particular partially leisure 
compensated/partially paid and purely leisure compensated overtime, seem to be equally 
important for the determination of the promotion probability. Furthermore, unpaid overtime 
hours do not necessarily have the expected negative impact on the likelihood of being laid off. 
On the contrary, the unpaid overtime coefficient is found to be significantly positive based on 
estimates for West German men, which indicates that unpaid hours do not help to prevent 
layoffs. Unpaid overtime hours were only found to be rewarded with job retention for the group 
of female workers in East Germany. These results were confirmed by the robustness checks and 
extensions to the model. We conclude that there is only partial empirical evidence for future 
payoffs of unpaid overtime work in the short run.  
 
These results are in contrast to earlier findings on Germany (Pannenberg, 2005) and Great 
Britain (Francesconi, 2001; Booth et al., 2003), as we find no persistent positive correlation 
between current overtime hours and future payoffs, when unobserved heterogeneity is controlled 
for. However, Francesconi (2001) and Booth et al. (2003) both use random effects panel 
estimators to determine the probability of promotion, which do not allow for correlations 
between the individual specific effect and explanatory variables. Furthermore, they do not Discussion Papers   535 
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distinguish between different compensation forms of overtime. Therefore, a further extension to 
the present model would be to investigate the relationship between total overtime hours and the 
promotion probability with a random effects estimator in order to compare the results to their 
findings for Great Britain. The contrast to the findings of long-term earnings effects of unpaid 
overtime for West Germany (Pannenberg, 2005) might be explained by the differing time 
horizons, as the present study focused on the future period within the three subsequent years. As 
another extension, one might hence consider unpaid overtime effects on excess wage growth, 
promotions, and layoffs for longer time periods. However, this clearly restricts the generalization 
of the results, as only workers who stay at their firm for a long time period can be analyzed, 
which might bias the result due to non-random sample selection. The relationship between 
unpaid overtime hours and the probability of layoff has not been analyzed to date, and requires 
further research. The objective of future research is to explain the positive association between 
unpaid extra hours and future dismissals, which arises for male workers mainly in West 
Germany. Potential explanations might be that unpaid overtime is taken as a signal for lower 
productivity, since extra hours might be used by unproductive workers to catch up with their 
more productive colleagues, and therefore to understate the working time actually taken in order 
to build a good reputation (Bell and Hart, 1999). Another explanation might be that workers 
provide unpaid overtime hours in firms which are at risk to close down. The threat of firm 
closure may induce workers to make concessions in form of unpaid extra hours, and still lead to 
a higher likelihood of dismissal for these workers. This issue clearly needs further investigation. 
 
A number of additional extensions is required to refine the analysis and to further investigate 
some findings of the model. One feature that we want to implement is an additional correction 
for selectivity bias, as not only the probability to stay within the same firm for a certain period of 
time might be non-random but also the choice for a workplace according to overtime 
compensation. Workers might not be assigned randomly to jobs in which overtime hours are 
paid, credited on a working time account or not paid at all. As a consequence, the estimates of 
the logit model might be biased, as the effect of unpaid overtime hours on future payoffs might 
be confused with the worker’s underlying choice for a particular job with or without unpaid 
hours. To correct for this selectivity, the probability of a worker to be in a workplace with paid, 
leisure compensated, or unpaid overtime should be estimated in the first stage. However, the 
difficulty is that the SOEP does not provide information on the general overtime compensation 
policy of the firm. Therefore, no information is provided on which type of overtime would have 
been available to workers who currently do not work overtime. Additionally, it is not known 
whether any compensation would have been available for unpaid overtime workers, i.e. if they 
had the option to work either compensated or uncompensated extra hours. However, to 
approximate this probability, a reduced form selection model might be used to estimate the 
probability of observing unpaid overtime.  
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Furthermore, it might be important to treat the three different outcomes of the analysis above not 
independently from one another, but consider them as simultaneous decisions by the firm. In 
addition, one might not only consider the probabilities of excess wage growth, promotions, and 
layoffs, but also take into account other possible changes which might occur in the workplace, 
such as separations due to voluntary quits or firm closedown. If the complete set of possible 
events in a employer-employee relationship can be defined, a nested logit model might be 
estimated which assumes a sequence of choices. This model would take into account more 
events than just the three considered above, and therefore represent the choices in an 
employment relationship in a more realistic way. Lastly, the analysis might be extended to a 
dynamic framework. Modeling the dynamic aspects of choices of both the worker and the firm 
by taking into account variables from the past might help to further improve the analysis of 
future consequences of working hours.  







Table A1:  Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Logit Model 
   Mean  (SD) 
Variable Description  West East 
 Dependent  Variables    
Incgrowth  Income growth: 1=excess growth in monthly income, no=0     
 - tplus1   - in the subsequent year  0.09  0.10 
 - tplus2   - within the two subsequent years  0.18  0.19 
 - tplus3   - within the three subsequent years  0.25  0.26 
Promo  Promotion: 1= being promoted, no=0     
 - tplus1   - in the subsequent year  0.01  0.01 
 - tplus2   - within the two subsequent years  0.03  0.02 
 - tplus3   - within the three subsequent years  0.05  0.04 
Dismissal Dismissal:  1=  being dismissed, no=0     
 - tplus1   - in the subsequent year  0.02  0.06 
 - tplus2   - within the two subsequent years  0.04  0.11 
 - tplus3   - within the three subsequent years  0.06  0.15 
      
  Working Hours    
Contrh  Contractual hours per week   38.28(2.21)  39.78(2.04) 
Desired  Desired hours per week  37.39(6.53)  38.22(7.53) 
Unpaidovh  Unpaid overtime hours per week  0.68(2.47)  0.80(2.79) 
Paidovh  Paid overtime hours per week  0.56(2.14)  0.57(2.18) 
Leispaidovh  Partly paid/leisure compensated overtime hours per week  0.67(2.11)  0.62(2.05) 
Leisovh  Leisure compensated overtime hours per week  0.75(1.89)  0.73(1,83) 
      
  Socio-Demographic Variables    
Age  Age in years  38.57(9.84)  40.44(9.58) 
Married  Marital status: 1= married or cohabiting, else = 0  0.84(0.37)  0.89 
Child0_3  Children 0-3 years old: 1= yes, no=0  0.11  0.07 
Child4_6  Children 4-6 years old: 1= yes, no=0  0.11  0.07 
Child7_10  Children 7-10 years old: 1= yes, no=0  0.14  0.09 
Child11_16  Children 11-16 years old: 1= yes, no=0  0.34  0.57 
     
  Wage, Education and Work Experience    
Mincome  Monthly income including extra payments, in Euros  2,799.5(1,327) 1,867.1(764.8) 
Edu  Length of education in years  38.57(9.84)  40.44(9.58) 
Tenure   Work experience at the same employer in years   10.82(9.15)  8.80(8.95) 
Expfull   Previous work experience as full-time employee in years  18.01(10.22)  20.37(9.80) 
Exppart  Previous work experience as part-time employee in years  1.07(2.74)  1.12(2.82) 
      
  Job Characteristics    
Public  Public sector: 1=yes, else=0  0.21  0.31 
Change  Change of job: 1=yes, else=0  0.10  0.12 
Tempjob  Temporary job: 1= yes, no=0  0.03  0.04 
Jobsat  Satisfaction with job: 1= satisfied, else=0  0.81  0.77 
Job0  No training necessary for the job: 1=yes, else=0;  
Reference category  0.01  0.01 
Job1  Briefing or courses necessary for the job: 1=yes, else=0  0.22  0.20 
Job2  Vocational training necessary for the job: 1=yes, else=0  0.62  0.59 
Job3  College/University necessary for the job: 1=yes, else=0  0.12  0.11 




Occ2  Occupation: 1=Professional, else=0  0.13  0.12 
Occ3 Occupation:  1=Technician,  else=0  0.25  0.22 
Occ4 Occupation:  1=Clerk,  else=0  0.16  0.12 
Occ5  Occupation: 1=Service/Sales worker, else=0  0.06  0.07 
Occ6  Occupation: 1=Craft worker, else=0  0.22  0.27 
Occ7 Occupation:  1=Plant/machine operator, else=0  0.09  0.10 
Occ8  Occupation: 1=Elementary occupation, else=0  0.04  0.06 
Bluecol  Blue-collar worker=1, else=0  0.35  0.45 
Bluecol0  Blue-collar worker: 1=unskilled, else=0; Reference category  0.01  0.01 
Bluecol1  Blue-collar worker: 1=skilled, else=0  0.09  0.09 
Bluecol2  Blue-collar worker: 1=semiskilled, else=0  0.19  0.29 
Bluecol3  Blue-collar worker: 1=foreman, else=0  0.03  0.04 
Bluecol4  Blue-collar worker: 1=master, else=0  0.01  0.02 
Whiteco0  White-collar worker: 1=foreman, else=0; Reference category  0.02  0.01 
Whiteco1  White-collar worker: 1=without vocational training, else=0  0.02  0.03 
Whiteco2  White-collar worker: 1=with vocational training, else=0  0.06  0.07 
Whiteco3  White-collar worker: 1=qualified occupation, else=0   0.33  0.26 
Whiteco4  White-collar worker: 1=highly qualified occupation, else=0  0.20  0.16 
Whiteco5  White-collar worker: 1=executive function, else=0  0.02  0.01 
     
  Industry (Reference Category: All Other Branches)     
Branch1  Branch: 1= Mining, oiling, and gas, else=0  0.01  0.01 
Branch2  Branch: 1= Textiles, else=0  0.01  0.01 
Branch3  Branch: 1= Wood and Paper, else=0  0.03  0.02 
Branch4  Branch: 1= Chemicals, else=0  0.08  0.04 
Branch5  Branch: 1= Metal, else=0  0.08  0.07 
Branch6  Branch: 1= Vehicle and engine construction, else=0  0.16  0.06 
Branch7  Branch: 1= Energy/Water, else=0  0.02  0.03 
Branch8  Branch: 1= Construction, else=0  0.07  0.15 
Branch9  Branch: 1= Wholesale and retail, else=0  0.12  0.10 
Branch10  Branch: 1= Hotel and restaurant, else=0  0.01  0.01 
Branch11  Branch: 1= Transport, else=0  0.05  0.08 
Branch12  Branch: 1= Banking and insurance, else=0  0.07  0.04 
Branch13  Branch: 1= Health sector, else=0  0.08  0.11 
Branch14  Branch: 1= Other services, else=0  0.13  0.20 
     
  Firm size     
Size0  Firm size < 5 employees; Reference category  0.03  0.06 
Size1  Firm size > 5 and <20  employees  0.12  0.18 
Size2  Firm size > 20 and < 200 employees  0.27  0.35 
Size3  Firm size > 200 and < 2000 employees  0.28  0.23 
Size4  Firm size > 2000 employees  0.29  0.17 
      
  Macro Variables    
U_District  Regional unemployment rate at the district level  9.39  17.67 
Growth  Real GDP growth rate of the worker’s industry   3.57  8.32 
      
  Observations  12,615 8,264 
Source: SOEP, 1993–2004 (own calculations) 
Sample: German male and female full-time employees, age 20-60, civil servants and self-employed persons 
excluded 
 





Table A2:  Probit Estimates: Probability of Staying in the Same Firm (West Germany) 
  Male Workers  Female Workers 
  t + 1  t + 2  t + 3  t + 1  t + 2  t + 3 
Age  0.014 0.041 0.042 -0.027  -0.010  -0.022 
  (0.57)  (1.96)*  (1.97)*  (0.81) (0.35) (0.75) 
Age2  0.000 -0.000  -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.73) (0.33) (0.30) (1.91) (1.63)  (2.01)* 
Married  -0.020 0.061 0.012 0.077 0.008 -0.030 
  (0.26) (0.93) (0.19) (0.85) (0.10) (0.36) 
Mincome_partner  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000  0.000 
  (2.02)*  (2.89)**  (2.66)**  (0.27) (0.53) (0.81) 
Child0_3  -0.073 -0.061 -0.031 -0.028 0.010 -0.066 
  (1.09) (1.00) (0.50) (0.26) (0.10) (0.63) 
Child4_6  -0.101 -0.053 -0.013 -0.041 -0.208 -0.300 
  (1.51) (0.87) (0.21) (0.32) (1.76)  (2.36)* 
Child7_10  -0.033 -0.049 -0.022 0.108  0.078 -0.007 
  (0.54) (0.89) (0.40) (0.69) (0.55) (0.05) 
Child11_16  0.029 -0.003 0.004 0.057 0.103 0.120 
  (0.51) (0.06) (0.09) (0.65) (1.30) (1.53) 
Mincome  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (5.07)** (6.77)** (7.48)**  (0.96)  (0.84)  (1.91) 
Jobsat  0.532 0.506 0.468 0.537 0.532 0.523 
  (10.29)** (10.78)** (10.03)**  (7.41)**  (7.91)**  (7.58)** 
Public  0.410 0.518 0.577 0.307 0.371 0.471 
  (5.18)** (7.47)** (8.67)** (3.65)** (4.84)** (6.08)** 
Overtime  hours  -0.021 -0.028 -0.032 -0.010 -0.025 -0.037 
  (3.65)** (5.47)** (6.24)**  (0.91)  (2.49)*  (3.54)** 
Regional unemployment     0.005  0.000  -0.003  0.002  0.002  0.014 
  (0.51) (0.04) (0.37) (0.14) (0.14) (1.21) 
GDPgrowth  0.000  0.000 -0.014 -0.019 -0.007 -0.011 
  (0.00) (0.02)  (2.86)**  (1.90) (0.91) (1.36) 
Constant  0.234 -0.767  -0.916 1.061 0.309 0.121 
  (0.53)  (2.01)*  (2.38)*  (1.87) (0.63) (0.24) 
Log-Likelihood  -1668.6 -2289.5 -2466.6  -829.5 -1069.91  -1075.5 
Pseudo  R2        0.097 0.105 0.105 0.115 0.114 0.135 
Observations  8,998 7,772 6,560 4,036 3,309 2,653 
Source: SOEP, 1993–2004 (own calculations) 
Sample: German male and female full-time employees, age 20-60, civil servants and self-employed persons 
excluded. 
*significant at the 5% level.
 **significant at the 1% level. Robust z statistics in parentheses. 
 





Table A3:  Logit Estimates: Probability of Payoff in the Next Year (West Germany), Odds Ratios 
 Excess  Earnings  Growth  Promotion Layoff 
  Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Unpaidovh    1.041 1.084 0.998 0.900 1.022 1.056 
  (2.63)**  (2.59)**  (0.04) (1.64) (0.82) (1.62) 
Paidovh    0.990 1.060 0.948 0.898 0.940 0.926 
  (0.60) (0.79) (0.77) (0.43) (1.65) (0.63) 
Leisovh    0.963 1.052 1.044 1.070 0.911 0.900 
  (1.40) (1.69) (1.10) (1.28) (1.88) (1.31) 
Leispaidovh    1.045 1.102 1.092 0.990 0.890 0.900 
  (2.70)**  (2.78)**  (2.98)**  (0.16) (1.84) (1.46) 
Contrh    1.038 0.950 0.969 0.874 1.011 1.038 
  (2.40)*  (1.50) (0.65) (1.72) (0.38) (0.77) 
Desired    1.019 1.002 1.042 1.030 0.990 1.005 
  (2.65)**  (0.21) (2.31)* (1.39) (0.90) (0.40) 
Age    0.988 0.966 1.212 1.004 0.898 1.143 
  (0.19) (0.51) (1.01) (0.01) (0.96) (1.09) 
Age2    0.999 1.000 0.996 1.000 1.002 0.998 
  (0.67) (0.06) (1.48) (0.06) (1.40) (1.06) 
Married    1.141 1.259 1.015 0.814 0.827 0.667 
  (1.16) (1.40) (0.06) (0.57) (0.93) (1.46) 
Edu    0.907 0.964 2.927 0.538 0.987 0.985 
  (0.61) (0.12) (2.25)* (0.91) (0.04) (0.03) 
Edu2  1.006 1.007 0.964 1.029 0.996 0.999 
  (0.98) (0.57) (2.14)* (1.10) (0.36) (0.03) 
Tenure    0.986 1.000 1.197 1.258 0.865 0.896 
 (0.90)  (0.01)  (3.11)**  (2.56)*  (4.55)**  (1.85) 
Tenure2    1.000 1.001 0.996 0.990 1.002 1.002 
 (0.93)  (0.55)  (2.01)*  (3.06)**  (2.95)**  (0.95) 
Expfull    1.024 1.035 0.893 0.951 0.939 1.029 
  (0.74) (0.89) (1.15) (0.36) (1.05) (0.39) 
Expfull2    1.000 1.000 1.002 1.001 1.001 0.999 
  (0.29) (0.12) (0.82) (0.34) (0.80) (0.65) 
Mincome    1.000 0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 (5.26)**  (7.15)**  (1.26)  (2.33)*  (3.74)**  (0.74) 
Change    1.298 1.317 3.785 4.585 1.641 2.222 
 (2.13)*  (1.48)  (4.34)**  (3.76)**  (2.53)*  (2.53)* 
Tempjob    1.679 1.467 0.652 0.744 0.875 0.978 
  (2.83)**  (1.58) (0.73) (0.45) (0.43) (0.05) 
Occ1    1.144 0.649 0.814 1.748 1.517 0.880 
 (0.48)  (0.75)  (0.32)  (8.20)**  (0.82)  (0.16) 
Occ2  1.370 1.368 0.471 1.084 1.051 0.514 
 (1.15)  (0.62)  (1.24)  (8.41)**  (0.09)  (0.75) 
Occ3  1.170 0.571 0.758 1.162 1.008 0.680 
 (0.65)  (1.38)  (0.47)  (8.77)**  (0.02)  (0.60) 
Occ4  0.945 0.617 0.811 1.580 0.911 0.522 
 (0.22)  (1.17)  (0.33)  (8.73)**  (0.22)  (0.96) 
Occ5  0.770 0.416 0.969 2.191 1.262 0.604 
 (0.79)  (2.11)*  (0.04)  (6.04)**  (0.46)  (0.76) 
Occ6  1.276 0.622 0.850 1.442 1.468 0.777 
 (1.12)  (1.06)  (0.26)  (8.99)**  (1.15)  (0.33) 
Occ7 1.302  1.924  0.927  -  0.982  0.312 
 (1.19)  (1.58)  (0.12)  -  (0.05)  (1.03) 
Skilled_blue  0.987 0.790 0.512 7.880 0.482 0.851 
 (0.09)  (0.52)  (1.60)  (9.90)**  (3.21)**  (0.18) 
Unskilled_white   1.358  1.870  0.817  -  0.657  2.763 
 (1.30)  (1.66)  (0.32)  -  (0.90)  (1.57) 




 (0.88)  (0.95)  (0.01)  (8.28)**  (0.86)  (1.08) 
Public  0.604 0.907 1.211 1.287 0.300 0.221 
  (3.22)**  (0.46) (0.56) (0.48)  (2.61)**  (3.27)** 
Size1  1.124 1.115 2.752 1.537 1.074 0.973 
 (0.49)  (0.33)  (0.88)  (2.40)*  (0.25)  (0.07) 
Size2  1.230 1.379 1.969 1.170 0.805 0.677 
 (0.89)  (0.97)  (5.98)**  (2.66)**  (0.75)  (0.95) 
Size3  1.397 1.726 1.872 1.091 0.722 0.597 
 (1.40)  (1.58)  (8.74)**  (2.91)**  (1.00)  (1.12) 
Size4  1.572 1.837 1.462 1.719 0.515 0.314 
 (1.85)  (1.71)  (3.05)**  (3.03)**  (1.82)  (2.09)* 
Branch1  0.898  - - -  4.231  - 
  (0.22)  - - -  (1.74)  - 
Branch2 0.520  0.219  -  -  1.491  1.572 
 (1.21)  (2.38)*  -  -  (0.66)  (0.60) 
Branch3  1.656 0.860 2.953 2.361 0.576 0.938 
  (2.08)*  (0.33) (1.96)* (0.74) (1.01) (0.09) 
Branch4  0.936 0.433 0.686 0.604 0.904 0.835 
  (0.35)  (2.02)* (0.67) (0.48) (0.27) (0.24) 
Branch5  1.032 0.562 0.703 4.720 0.830 1.300 
  (0.18) (1.32) (0.65) (1.68) (0.52) (0.34) 
Branch6  1.230 0.870 1.174 2.357 1.078 0.208 
  (1.36) (0.40) (0.37) (1.09) (0.26) (1.45) 
Branch7  1.292  3.764  2.646 - 0.407 - 
  (0.90)  (1.88)  (1.74) - (0.81) - 
Branch8  1.078 0.894 0.827 3.122 1.130 2.072 
  (0.44) (0.20) (0.27) (1.07) (0.43) (1.10) 
Branch9  1.029 0.871 0.833 2.534 0.750 1.413 
  (0.16) (0.49) (0.34) (1.02) (0.97) (0.79) 
Branch10 1.780  1.176  -  41.986  0.922  2.507 
 (1.28)  (0.27)  -  (2.59)**  (0.12)  (1.52) 
Branch11 0.822  0.720  1.492  -  1.078  0.604 
 (0.86)  (0.74)  (0.76)  -  (0.19)  (0.45) 
Branch12  1.591 1.101 1.272 1.698 0.260 0.459 
  (2.01)*  (0.28) (0.49) (0.60) (1.29) (0.94) 
Branch13  0.964 0.965 1.392 2.082 0.626 1.295 
  (0.14) (0.11) (0.54) (0.69) (0.76) (0.59) 
Branch14  0.875 0.639 1.826 2.155 0.625 1.312 
  (0.69) (1.40) (1.21) (0.75) (1.19) (0.55) 
year1994  1.154 0.664 1.726 2.424 0.867 1.516 
  (0.88) (1.53) (1.04) (1.49) (0.41) (0.74) 
year1995  0.828 0.312 1.354 0.791 1.018 1.661 
  (1.10)  (3.99)**  (0.56) (0.36) (0.06) (0.96) 
year1996  1.127 0.798 2.512 1.091 1.723 0.879 
  (0.72) (0.82) (1.81) (0.14) (1.66) (0.21) 
year1997  1.304 0.874 2.914 0.107 1.025 1.252 
  (1.66) (0.49) (2.17)* (1.76) (0.07) (0.37) 
year1998  0.886 0.609 2.017 0.807 1.767 2.216 
  (0.70) (1.72) (1.37) (0.34) (1.67) (1.48) 
year1999  1.071 0.779 2.638 0.496 0.837 0.802 
  (0.41) (0.84) (1.91) (0.86) (0.47) (0.37) 
year2000  1.333 0.984 3.074 0.984 0.681 0.948 
  (1.65) (0.05) (2.05)* (0.02) (0.93) (0.09) 
year2001  1.327 0.639 3.205 0.706 1.353 1.395 
  (1.56) (1.44) (2.16)* (0.47) (0.74) (0.57) 
year2002  1.262 1.154 2.156 0.595 1.147 0.712 
  (1.35) (0.49) (1.43) (0.82) (0.37) (0.55) 
year2003  -  -  0.991 0.562 1.291 1.876 
  -  -  (0.01) (0.91) (0.65) (1.19) 
GDP_growth  0.999 0.975 1.034 0.970 1.001 0.944 




PosGDPgrowth  1.071 1.744 0.761 0.946 1.041 1.518 
  (0.63) (1.67) (0.69) (0.09) (0.20) (0.87) 
Region1  1.233 0.976 0.686 1.012 1.068 0.061 
  (0.56) (0.05) (0.53) (0.01) (0.11)  (2.52)* 
Region2  1.775 1.955 1.656 3.210 0.304 0.374 
  (1.32) (1.14) (0.78) (0.83) (1.02) (1.38) 
Region3  1.815 1.065 0.581 2.813 0.586 0.190 
  (1.87) (0.16) (0.95) (1.13) (1.05)  (3.10)** 
Region4  2.440  1.624  1.423 - 1.052 - 
  (2.03)*  (0.64)  (0.37) - (0.07) - 
Region5  1.646 1.417 0.387 1.641 0.779 0.258 
  (1.62) (0.97) (1.76) (0.55) (0.51)  (2.96)** 
Region6  1.858 0.838 0.795 0.266 0.990 0.244 
  (1.92) (0.43) (0.39) (1.44) (0.02)  (2.10)* 
Region7  1.678 1.374 0.584 1.371 0.870 0.213 
  (1.58) (0.78) (0.91) (0.29) (0.25)  (2.23)* 
Region8  1.209 1.168 0.658 1.412 0.638 0.196 
  (0.60) (0.40) (0.79) (0.36) (0.75)  (2.63)** 
Region9  1.405 1.311 0.408 1.503 0.946 0.198 
  (1.09) (0.72) (1.65) (0.44) (0.10)  (2.58)** 
Mills_Men  1.065    37.093     
  (0.10)    (2.37)*     
Mills_Women   0.267   44.954     
   (1.25)  (1.61)    
Child0_3       0.851  1.135 
       (0.65)  (0.37) 
Child4_6       0.608  1.042 
       (1.75)  (0.11) 
Child7_10       1.202  0.983 
       (0.85)  (0.04) 
Child11_16      0.975  0.617 
       (0.15)  (1.52) 
Regional  Unemployment        1.037  0.968 
       (0.87)  (0.61) 
Log-Likelihood  -2,546.0  -896.6 -508.1 -213.7 -837.9 -383.9     
Pseudo R2     0.053    0.122  0.202    0.266  0.183  0.187 
Observations  7,802 3,466 8,350 3,260  10,887  5,081 
Source: SOEP, 1993–2004 (own calculations) 
Sample: German male and female full-time employees, age 20-60, civil servants and self-employed persons 
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